Tag Archives: Republicans

Republican policies don’t help people of color

The United States continues to struggle with persistent racial gaps. There are large gaps between blacks and whites in terms of income, political representation, treatment in the criminal justice system, upward mobility and wealth. And the illusion of a postracial society, particularly in the younger generation, is hindering efforts to reduce these gaps. While Democrats say they are trying to alleviate racial gaps by increasing the ladders of opportunity for people of color, Republicans continue to pretend these gaps do not exist.

In their study “Racial Winners and Losers in American Party Politics,” political scientists Zoltan Hajnal and Jeremy Horowitz examine the two parties’ claims that their policies benefit racial and ethnic minorities. According to Hajnal’s and Horowitz’s research, Republican policies predominately benefit the richest white Americans. An oft-repeated defense of this fact is that Republicans make the pie bigger for everyone while Democrats work to redistribute wealth to the poor and people of color. The evidence demonstrates that, on the contrary, Democrats make the pie bigger for everyone, while Republicans redistribute income toward the rich and whites. (See chart below.)

The popular criticism that both parties are the arms of a corporate America also misses the granular changes that shape income distribution. As political scientist Nathan Kelly has shown (PDF), Democratic governments don’t just shift the income distribution with explicitly redistributive programs; they change pretax income distributions to favor the wealthy through what he terms market conditions such as regulation. Sociologists David Brady and Kevin Leicht find the same effect from right-wing governments, both before and after taxes and transfers. The changes combine to dramatically improve the income distribution under a Democratic president.

Hajnal and Horowitz looked at available data for changes in income, poverty and unemployment under every president since 1948. The authors lagged the data by one year since presidential actions take time to trickle down. For example, a decrease in black poverty in 2009 would be credited to George W. Bush’s administration. As shown in the table below, all racial and ethnic groups appear to benefit economically more under Democratic administrations than Republican ones.

AJAM4.1

Although they still benefit significantly more from a Democratic president, the gap between the two parties is the smallest for whites. Hajnal and Horowitz estimate that black poverty declined by 38.6 percent under Democratic leadership, while it grew by 3 percent under Republicans. From 1948 to 2010, black unemployment fell by 7.9 percentage points under Democrats and increased by 13.7 points during Republican administrations. Black income grew by $23,281 (adjusted for inflation) under Democrats and by only $4,000 under Republicans.

“Put simply: However measured, blacks made consistent gains under Democratic presidents and suffered regular losses under Republicans,” the authors said. While there’s limited data, the findings hold true for Latinos and Asians.

It appears at first glance that Republicans actively transfer income to whites through government. Of course, there could be another explanation for this phenomenon. In a study published last July, Princeton economists Alan Blinder and Mark Watson found that from 1947 to 2013, gross domestic product, employment, corporate profits and productivity grew faster under Democrats than Republicans. The authors also noted that unemployment and deficits shrank and the economy climbed out of recession in less time under Democrats. (See chart.)

AJAM4.2

Blinder and Watson attribute half these benefits to productivity shocks, consumer expectations and favorable economic conditions. They leave the other half unexplained, but studies suggest that liberal policies increase growth by boosting wages and perceptions about income security. By contrast, Republican policies slow growthand immiserate the population. The researchers also found that the economy grew even faster when Democrats control both chambers of Congress and the presidency.

It might appear that Democrats are better at managing the economy. However, as Hajnal and Horowitz point out, economic growth alone is not enough to explain racial gaps under the two parties. In fact, the results remain unchanged even after controlling for factors such as inflation, the size of the labor force, the price of oil and GDP. They found that black incomes grew by $1,000 more each year under Democrats, while poverty fell 2.6 points faster and unemployment dropped by 1 point more.

Black income growth stalls when a Democratic president is paired with a Republican Congress. Furthermore, the longer Democrats are in power, the stronger the economic gains for blacks. By contrast, blacks fare worse when Republicans are in office longer. There are similar racial gaps in the criminal justice system. Black and white incarceration rates fell dramatically (a net of 61 fewer arrests per 1,000 residents) under Democratic presidents, while they increased (36 more arrests per 1,000 residents) under Republican leadership.

Last place aversion

This raises questions about why whites largely lean Republican in elections and who benefits from Republican control of our government. The answers are intertwined. As Princeton political scientist Larry Bartels explains, economic growth is shared far more equally under Democratic presidents than under Republicans. (See chart below.) Contrary to popular belief, the incomes of the very rich increase more under Democrats than they do under Republicans. While pretax and transfer incomes are rather similar, the main shift occurs posttax and transfer.

AJAM4.3

Similarly, in absolute terms, whites do better under Democratic than under Republican leadership. But that doesn’t really matter. People weigh their well-being relative to those around them. There is strong evidence that whites often oppose actions against inequality because of “last place aversion,” the desire to ensure that there is a class of people below oneself. Among white voters, racial bias is strongly correlated with lower support of redistributive programs. For example, research shows that opposition to welfare is driven by racial anger. Approximately half of the difference between social spending in the U.S. and Europe can be explained by racial animosity.

Democrats enjoy a broad-based support among the American electorate. But they lose elections because of enthusiasm gap, which is attributed to the party’s inability to rally a diverse coalition of educated, working-class whites, people of color and unmarried women. By contrast, the Republican base is easy to mobilize, allowing them to turn the government into an efficient patronage machine for whites and the top 1 percent of U.S. earners, using what Suzanne Mettler, a professor of government at Cornell University, calls the “submerged state” — subtle tax breaks and benefits such as marriage subsidies and the mortgage interest deduction.

All in all, those who claim that Democrats have abandoned the middle class or failed blacks are missing a larger story. While the Democratic Party has been imperfect in responding to the policy demands and preferences ofblacks and low-income voters, it has done a far better job of improving their condition than Republicans have. Conservatives’ attempts to rebrand themselves as beneficial to the working class or people of color will succeed only if voters remain unaware of their actual record.

This piece originally appeared on Al Jazeera.

Rubio Will Likely Be The Republican Nominee

Barring a massive strategic blunder, Marco Rubio is well-positioned to become the Republican nominee for President in 2016. The Florida senator is the ideal candidate to expand the Reagan coalition while holding on to the conservative base and he can take shots at Clinton that would sound hypocritical coming from Bush. While his power as a candidate has yet to emerge in the polls, a misstep by Bush will send him straight to the top.

Right now the Republican party is deeply fractured, and its coalition, at least at the presidential level, is weak. Republicans have failed to win the popular vote in 5 of the last 6 elections, and when they were successful, it was largely because of George W. Bush’s modest success with Latinos. The problem Republicans face going into 2016 is that the rise of the nativist Tea Party makes it difficult for them to woo Latino voters without losing their base. Rubio offers them such a bridge candidate.

Before exploring why Rubio could act as a bridge between conservatives and Latinos, it’s important to explode a key myth — that Republicans simply can’t win Latino voters; as I’ve noted before, there are indications that they can.. The problem is that appeals to Latino voters will often alienate the more nativist Tea Party portions of the Republican base. Thus, the GOP needs to find a candidate that can perform well enough to neutralize the Latino vote but also ensure that the conservative base turns out to vote.

According to data from a recent Economist/Yougov poll, while no Republican candidate has a net favorability with Latinos, Rubio dramatically outperforms Bush. The split among conservatives is perhaps even starker: Rubio holds a 37 percent net favorability and Bush holding a 15 percent net favorability.

Republicans will also want to make inroads with the poor, the middle class and youth. Here again, Rubio has a distinct advantage, polling strongly with young people and the middle class (those making between $40,000 and $100,000). Among those making less than $40,000, Bush and Rubio are at a dead heat. (Scott Walker polls significantly better than both in this category, however.)

It could be that as Rubio becomes more well known, he’ll become less popular. This has clearly happened to Bush, who has seen his net favorability drop from negative 5.9 points in February 4, 2013, when 42 percent of respondents said that had “not heard enough” to judge him, to negative 16.2 points on April 21, 2015, with only 16.8 percent of respondents saying they had “not heard enough.” But even this argument doesn’t sink Rubio. In the same Yougov poll, Rubio’s “do not know enough” score is only 4 points higher than Bush among Latinos, 6 points higher among young voters (18-29) and 8 points higher with the middle class. Even assuming all of these “don’t knows” dislike Rubio (unlikely) his net favorability would still be higher than Bush’s.

As the chart below from Sam Wang shows, as a Republican becomes more well-known, he also becomes less popular. Bush fits perfectly on the trend, while Rubio is slightly above it and Walker is slightly below it. In a recent Wall Street Journal/NBC Poll, completed before Rubio announced his candidacy, 56 percent of Republican primary voters said they could see themselves supporting Rubio, with only 26 percent saying they couldn’t. Only Scott Walker, with 53 percent and 17 percent respectively, had better numbers, and Jeb Bush pulled in a squalid 49 percent in favor, 42 percent against.

Republicans consider who their nominee will be must also consider how they are going to run against Clinton. It’s likely that they will prefer three major criticisms: First, that she’s dynastic; second, that she’s too old (an argument with sexist undertones, to be certain, but it may still resonate with voters); and third, that her Washington-insider status should disqualify her. Each of these arguments will be muted in the case of a Bush nomination, but could be much more persuasive coming from Rubio — the son of a immigrant father and a working class mother with strong Tea Party connections. He’s young and he’s targeted much of his rhetoric towards benefitting the middle class (no matter their dubious merit).

To test whether Rubio might be a better foil to Clinton, we can look at the Real Clear Politics General Election Match-Ups. The current average suggests that in a head-to-head election with Clinton, Rubio would lose by 7.5 points. The three most recent polls show Clinton up by 14 points, 2 points and 4 points respectively. In all three, Rubio loses. However, his margin is still lower than Bush, who loses by 8.9 points on average, and 17 points, 7 points and 4 points respectively. Walker loses by 8.6 points on average (22 points, 5 points and 6 points, respectively).

The most recent polls, taken from March and April, are shown below, where each bar corresponds to Hillary Clinton’s margin of victory in a hypothetical matchup:

The other conceivable option on the table is Scott Walker, who does poll well with blue-collar Americans. The problem is that his strategy for winning the White House relies entirely on maintaining the old Republican coalition, which won’t be appealing to party elites. Recently, for example, he signaled opposition to immigration reform, which isn’t surprising given his vision of the party’s future, but will ultimately doom him as a candidate. Without making inroads into the Latino vote, Republicans will never take back the White House.

The arguments against Rubio, meanwhile, are melting away. Worried about his embarrassing SOTU response? Witness his energetic and moving announcement speech. Worried he won’t get the support of big backers? Sheldon Adelson may back his campaign. The failure of immigration reform in 2013? No support among party elites? Rubio just got kind comments from Brooks and Douthat. Stagnant wages and stunted upward mobility? Marco Rubio said it best in his announcement:

My candidacy might seem improbable to some watching from abroad. In many countries, the highest office in the land is reserved for the rich and powerful. But I live in an exceptional country where even the son of a bartender and a maid can have the same dreams and the same future as those who come from power and privilege.

Indeed, Rubio’s biggest problem seems to be that his impressive qualities show up everywhere but in the polls: Real Clear Politics still puts him below Walker and Bush. However, Rubio offers a perfect embodiment of the Republican vision of the American Dream. He’s offering a vision that may can win enough Latinos, working-class white, youth and Republican regulars to credibly threaten Hillary. He’ll likely be the Republican candidate.

This piece originally appeared on Salon

How Progressive Policies Boost Economic Growth

At the core of the debate between liberals and conservatives is a dispute over whose policies are better for economic growth, and particularly for the middle class. A new studyby Bryan Dettrey and Harvey D. Palmer suggests one way to test this question — by examining how economic growth differs under Republican and Democratic presidencies. Their finding might not be too surprising: Under Republicans, growth boosts the stock market, while under Democrats, it reduces unemployment.

The two academics examine how economic growth is distributed over time. Their data are expansive, covering the 60-year period from January 1951 to December 2010. They find that once economic growth increases above 1 percent a year — and it does so over most of the period they studied — “the average level of unemployment is significantly higher under Republican administrations.”

As the above charts (from their paper) show, with either a one- or two-year lag, Democrats reduce unemployment dramatically during periods of GDP growth compared to Republicans. Some of this effect has to do with inflation rates (as a I note below), but the authors note another key difference: They argue that Republican policies (for instance, massive tax cuts for the rich and cuts to capital gains) incentivize corporations to use money to compensate CEOs or distribute to shareholders, rather than invest in workers and jobs.

Dettrey and Palmer are not the first academics to raise these points. In a 2004 paper, Larry Bartels showed that “Democratic presidents have produced slightly more income growth for poor families than for rich families.” He updated that analysis earlier this year and found the same result. One reason he cites is the minimum wage: Its real value increased 16 cents a year under Democrats, but decreased by 6 cents a year under Republicans. Aseminal study by Douglas Hibbs found that “the unemployment rate was driven downward by Democratic and Labor administrations and upward by Republican and Conservative governments.” In another study, Alan Blinder and Mark Watson found that the economy grows faster under Democrats, but couldn’t determine why. It could be that the safety net boosts entrepreneurship by making Americans feel more economically secure (and willing to take risks).

There is also an increasingly large body of research on differing government policies at the state level. Christopher Witko and Nathan Kelly note that “since the Republican takeover of Congress in 1995, the states have played a more important role in shaping the income distribution,” and, consequently, in driving income inequality. In another paper, Elizabeth Rigby and Megan Hatch identify three major policies that states can pursue to slow the income growth of the 1 percent. In particular, they find that “policies played a significant role in shaping income inequality in the states.” If states had adopted more liberal policies, Rigby and Hatch suggest, the increase in inequality (as measured by the Gini Coefficient) would have been 60 percent smaller — and the share going to the top 1 percent would have been halved.

(Story continues below the chart.)

Overall, Hatch and Rigby find that conservative policies tend to exacerbate inequality, while liberal policies tend to reduce it. Rigby tells me that the “more redistribution” scenario can be considered the “liberal” scenario, and “less redistribution” the “conservative” scenario, although Democrats don’t always line up perfectly behind liberal policies. Kelly and Witko concur: “We observe that when unions are stronger and left party governments are in power at either the federal or state level we see lower levels of inequality.” Numerous other studies surveyed by Anne Case and Timothy Besley suggestthat Democrats boost government spending, particularly on workers’ compensation and Medicaid (see pages 44 and 45).

Finally, it’s worth noting the racial impacts of these policies. I recently highlighted research by Zoltan Hajnal and Jeremy Horowitz showing that people fare far better under Democrats than Republicans. Given that black and Latino Americans are more likely to end up unemployed — research suggests this is part of the reason for the racial wealth gap — Republicans’ preference for tightening monetary policy is most likely to fall on people of color. Conservatives may not be intending to harm black people, but their policies can end up having a disproportionate impact on them nonetheless.

Inequality did not arise in a vacuum. Government policy plays a significant role in determining the distribution of income. To take one policy, Anthony Atkinson and Andrew Leigh find that reductions in tax rates explain between one half and one third of the rising share of income going to the 1 percent in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the U.K. and the U.S. (As I’ve noted elsewhere, there is strong evidence that unions and Democrats can reduce inequality, although unions are more effective.) Meanwhile, Olivier Bargain and others find that tax policy accounted for at least 29 percent of the increase in inequality between 1979 and 2007, and likely more. Further, they find, “Republican policymakers increased inequality especially at the top whereas Democrats increased the income share of the bottom 80 percent of the distribution.”

These findings decimate the idea that there isn’t “a dime’s worth of difference” between America’s two major parties. Many commentators in particular focus too much on marquee policies and miss the “market conditioning” and other minor policies that Republicans and Democrats pursue in office, which can have an outsized impact on economic outcomes. (The fact that these same commentators often worry about “rising polarization” is telling.)

In fact, there are differences in the way Republicans and Democrats govern. Pretending there aren’t doesn’t just sow confusion, it may hurt the left as well. A recent study findsthat when people don’t perceive large differences between the parties, they are less likely to vote; and when people become alienated from the political process, they are less likely to vote. By contrast, as David Brockington argues, “choice-rich environments” increase the probability that people will turn out to vote.

It is clear that the parties offer distinct options to voters. While it is certainly true that liberal parties sometimes do less to fight inequality in the era of globalized finance, they still have an important influence over outcomes. The Republican party has indeed become the party of the rich.

Worryingly, however, Jan Leighley and Jonathan Nagler find that “respondents who perceive a greater difference between the candidates… are more likely to vote.” And “those in the top income quintile see a larger difference between the candidates on ideology than do those in the bottom quintile.” Research suggests that when voters gain more information, they shift to support more liberal policies and parties. In the current system, much of the problem rests in the fact that low-income and middle-income voters don’t realize that conservatives are fleecing them. The rich do realize they benefit fromRepublicans, and therefore have an incentive to turn out. Commentators who suggest that the two parties are the same, rather than galvanizing Democrats toward more progressive policies, may be simply keeping conservatives in power.

This piece originally appeared on Salon

When Retailers Shop the Season Doesn’t End at Christmas

Co-written with Catherine Ruetschlin, Senior Policy Analyst at Demos.

Unfortunately for voters, the $3.7 billion spent over the most recent election cycle did not come with a gift receipt. Despite being rung up as the most expensive midterm in US history, nearly two-thirds of Americans sat out the election—the lowest voter turnout in more than 70 years. Those who didn’t turn-out were disproportionately low-income people, who are increasingly shut out of the political process. It makes sense to see growing disillusionment with politics alongside massive outside spending, since the interests of ultra-wealthy donors are unlikely to reflect the experiences of most citizens. On issues like the minimum wage, the divergence can be stark. That is one reason why low-wage retail workers are making their case for better working conditions in big-box parking lots for the third straight year of Black Friday strikes. They need a public forum on the Walmart economy, and big-box retail took the last one on the shelf.

In our recent paper, Retail Politics: How America’s Big-Box Retailers Turn Their Economic Power into Political Influence, we found that the six largest big-box retailers in the US spent $30 million on campaign contributions and lobbying during the latest election cycle—that’s six times more than they spent in 2000. Walmart and Home Depot, in particular, rank among the top campaign spenders in the nation. And this spending is not like consumption spending on, say, some cheap imported merchandise, it is an investment with real returns.

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Political spending of big business is as much about flooding the process with friendly faces as it is about establishing access once the election is over. The campaign and committee donations of wealthy interests first fill the playing field with candidates who share their priorities, and then elevate the issues they care about most. Over time, big-box retailers have supported Republicans over Democrats by a clear margin of 2-to1. But in the 2014 cycle these companies spent their political dollars widely, giving on both sides of the aisle—and even donating to opposing candidates in contested races.

2MyReport3_PartySpendingRatio

This campaign spending combines with millions of dollars in lobbying to allow those with the fattest wallets to shape the country’s political agenda. As a result, the small population of affluent Americans sees their priorities reflected in our legislative objectives, even when the majority of the country disagrees with their preferences. For example, taxes were the most frequently lobbied issue by big-box retailers in 2014 by a large margin. This legislative area has proven lucrative for business in the past—experts in corporate strategy research show that a 1 percent increase in businesses lobbying expenditures yields a lower effective tax rate of between 0.5 and 1.6 percent for the firm. Yet when there is conflict between big corporations and other interests over policy change, policy sides with big business lobbyists the vast majority of the time.

Meanwhile, the increase in big-box retail’s political spending occurred at the same time that the most important lobby for workers floundered. Previous research by our organization, Demos, has found that unions are the only interest group that consistently lobbies in the interests of average Americans. However, data from the Center for Responsive Politics show that business interests outspend unions 15 to 1. The democratic chorus in Washington has shifted from one that is broadly in favor of business interests to one virtually devoid of any other voices. It is unsurprising in this context that after an almost two-decade fall, the share of Americans saying that government is “run by a few big interests,” is as high as 70 percent.

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That loss of trust in the equal democratic voice for all Americans also reflects where the money is. According to data from American National Election Studies, unskilled workers  are more   likely to agree that government is run by a few big interests than their white collar and professional peers. That perception is reinforced by the escalating importance of private money in elections, and it shows an intuitive read of the very real problems with democracy, like research that suggests the preferences of average Americans simply won’t change much in Washington.

There are no Black Friday bargains when it comes to political contributions, but there are ways to make small-dollar donations matter more to those on the receiving end. Public finance, federal matching of small donors and effective lobbying regulations can amplify the voices currently drowned out by big money, and begin assuring Americans that democracy is not for sale.

This piece originally appeared on Huffington Post. 

Republicans at a Crossroads: Win Over People Of Color, or Make Sure They Don’t Vote?

Last week’s election has seen many Republicans scoffing at the thesis, put forward by John B. Judis and Ruy Teixeira in 2004, that there was an“Emerging Democratic Majority” that would usher in a long period of Democratic dominance. Ross Douthat, for example, has written of an “Evaporating Democratic Majority.” The subsequent analysis has often focused on low turnout among young voters — an important story, but far from the whole thing. In fact, this election sets the stage for how the Republican Party will react to changing demographics over the next several election cycles. Will they change their policies to appeal to a how America has changed, or will they try to change who gets to vote?

The dramatic age gap in the most recent midterm election has been frequently noted in recent discussions on the midterms. While it is certainly important that only 12 percent of voters in the most recent election were under 30 and 37% were over 60, this doesn’t tell much. About 12% of voters in the 2010 and 2006 elections were under 30 as well, if anything the increasing gap is largely due to the aging of the population (and persistent gaps in youth turnout). However, while the “liberalism” of youth has been widely discussed, there are problems with the narrative, among them, the huge differencesbetween young whites and young people of color (see chart). Much of the liberalism of millennials is not that young whites are more liberal, but simply that there are fewer of them. Even with these caveats, it’s clear that much of the current Republican agenda (particularly opposition to gay marriage) is anathema to young voters, while racial appeals make voters of color who might otherwise support Republicans wary.

 

The question for Republicans is how they will respond to an increasingly diverse population and one that doesn’t support their agenda. One option, and the one that gave them the Senate this year, is massive voter suppression. They will have many more opportunities for such suppression: Before the election, Republican controlled 59 of the 98 state legislative chambers; they now control 67. That means they’ll be able to pass more ALEC-sponsored legislation to reduce reproductive rights, bust unions and cut education and health insurance. It also means that Democrats will find it difficult to win back these chambers in time for the 2020 redistricting. (Redistricting is part — though not all — of the reason for Republican stranglehold over the House.) Republicans will also have leeway to pass even more restrictive voting laws — rolling back same-day registration and early voting, passing voter ID laws and tightening restrictions on convicted felons. All of these laws are proven to shift the electorate toward conservative policies by reducing turnout among people of color, young people and low-income people. Unsurprisingly, the ones already on the books have worked, and the 2014 midtermhad lower turnout than any election since 1942 (before the Voting Rights Act).

As I’ve shown, there is a strong chance that felon disenfranchisement laws affected the outcomes of important Senate races. I also found evidence that voter ID laws (particularly those that required a photo ID) reduced turnout. These findings are support by academic studies on the question. Long story short: It’s almost certain that voter suppression efforts led to an election in which three in ten eligible citizens voted. It’s highly likely that they tilted the playing field toward conservative politicians.

Republicans as a party could likely remain viable for a while with this strategy. They control enough legislatures to effectively gerrymander the congressional map. The Senate favors sparsely populated Conservative states. Democrats are concentrated in urban areas which further solidifies Republican avantages. Republicans would have trouble getting enough voters to win the Presidency, but with control of both bottom chambers, they could still gridlock the political system. Since such gridlock primarily benefits the rich, who are the main constituency of the Republican party, this isn’t much of a problem. Further, research shows that when whites are informed that the country is becoming increasingly diverse, they show a stronger preference for the Republican party. Recentresearch by Felix Danbold and Yuen J. Huo finds the whites informed that they will no longer be the majority in 2050 are less likely to say they support diversity. Political scientist Spencer Piston tells Salon that in his research using the American National Election Studies data, “I find no relationship between age and prejudice against blacks (as measured by a stereotype battery) among whites.” This suggests that voter suppression and coded racial appeals could serve Republicans for a long time.

The other option is for Republicans to tailor their agenda to people of color. While this may seem impossible — given the recent race-baiting by a gargle of Republican candidates — it is not. Spencer Piston recently released research showing that light-skinned Latinos and Asian-Americans are more likely to support Republicans than darker-skinned Latinos and Asian-Americans. He tells Salon that this held even after controlling for income, nationality and gender. Further, in currently unpublished research, he finds that support for redistribution is not affected by skin tone. This suggests that Republicans could possibly win over some Latino voters with a conservative message, if only they reduced racial resentment. But they won’t.

As I’ve shown, the class bias in our electorate benefits the rich. One study of developed countries finds that in countries with higher turnout, governments redistribute more money. The U.S. has the second lowest rate of turnout among OECD countries, and it also, unsurprisingly, has some of the lowest levels of redistribution. As long as the Republican party serves the interests of the rich, it will work endlessly to suppress low-income voters. Further, it will hold the government in gridlock, which benefits the rich.

At the end of the day, the sad fact is that the more people who vote, the worse it is for the wealthy people who overwhelmingly support Republicans.

There were other factors at play in the Senate race, certainly. The incredible cynicism of modern conservatives — who both actively sabotage government and then complain when it doesn’t works — was important. Americans, constantly told by pundits that a President should lead, appear to be unable to understand that deep structural factors prevent himfrom doing so (a problem on both sides). Further, in many races, the liberal candidateswere simply inept, and those who ran on truly progressive agendas, like Governor Malloy of Connecticut, did well.

However, it cannot be ignored that in recent years, one political party has centered their election agenda around disenfranchising voters. Midterms are historical bad for groups that vote Democratic, but massive voter suppression is the only way to explain the Republican “wave.”  With the aid of the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County,states have been able to pass legislation which cause mass disenfranchisement. There will certainly be more. As the country becomes more diverse, the Republican party has a choice: play on racial fears, stoking racial animus or try to broaden its coalition of voters. Right now, it has prefered the former. That isn’t good for democracy.

This piece originally appeared on Salon

Voter Suppression in the 2014 Midterm

Political scientist Michael P. McDonald recently released  preliminary turnout rates at the state (and national) level. These data are preliminary and will be continuously updated, but still yield some insights.

Firstly, we can look at the impact of felon disenfrachisement.

Research finds that felon disenfranchisement laws have influenced the outcomes of both presidential and Senate elections. Such laws disenfranchised almost 6 millions voters this year—most of them poor and people of color.

Just look at seven key Senate races and one gubernatorial race (Florida, where Rick Scott tightened felon re-enfranchisement laws in one of his first acts as governor) in the most recent elections. In three of those Senate races and the gubernatorial election, the number of disenfranchised felons was greater than the margin of victory. Not only does felon disenfranchisement contribute to the class and race bias in the electorate by primarilyimpacting low income people and people of color, it often disenfranchises more voters than the margin of victory.

Secondly, we can compare states with voter ID laws to those without.

Obviously, there are many other factors here. The states that tend to pass voter ID laws are a self-selected group. They tend to have more competitive elections and recent increases in turnout among low-income voters and African-Americans.

They are also almost all passed by Republican legislatures, reducing turnout. Recently, the GAO examined voter ID laws and finds that out of ten studies, five had mixed results, four showed a statistically significant drop in voter turnout and one showed an increase in voter turnout. GAO finds that turnout decreased between 1.9 and 2.2 percentage point in Kansas and 2.2 to 3.2 percentage points in Tennessee.

For this year’s midterm, comparing McDonald’s turnout estimates with states with photo ID, non-photo ID and no ID law at all shows that on average, states with a photo ID law had 4.4 percentage points lower turnout than those that did not. States with a non-photo ID law also had lower voter turnout, about 1.52 points lower than states without voter ID. There are numerous factors at work here, but given Silver’s findings, the GAO review and anecdotal evidence at polling stations, it is plausible voter ID depressed turnout.

Given that voter ID laws are generally passed in states with competitive races, we would expect to see higher turnout (election competiveness boosts turnout)—instead we see the opposite. The Brennan Center has collected all of the studies on voter turnout here.

Third, we can examine the impact of same-day registration.

Research suggests that same-day registration reduces the class bias of the electorate. Previous Demos research finds that when same-day registration is available, hundreds of thousands of voters use it. Demos also finds that states with same-day registration consistently have higher levels of turnout than states without it. Numerous studies confirmthat SDR increases turnout.

And this was true in the 2014 midterms. States with SDR had turnout 7.92 points higher than states without SDR. This is likely a combination of factors, including the fact that states committed to turnout generally pass many reforms which work together to boost turnout.

Above all, turnout for the most recent election was dismal: 36.6%. That compares with 40.9% in 2010 and 40.4% in 2006. It’s the lowest of the last five elections. That’s why states should consider same-day registration, early voting, mail-in voting, felon re-enfranchisement and other laws that will get millions of voters to the polls next election.

This post originally appeared on Policyshop

Class Bias in the 2014 Midterms

In my recent Explainer, I discussed the implications of the voting gap on policy and elections. Numerous studies show that in states where low-income voters turnout at a higher rate, inequality is lower. That is because in these chambers, policymakers tend to be more liberal and favorable to policies to decrease economic inequality. Low-income turnout has been linked to higher social spending, more generous state health insurance programs for children, higher minimum wages and strong anti-predatory lending policies. In 2008 the gap between high and low income voters was 32.6 percent, and that this gap increased by 2.3 points to 34.6 in the 2010 midterm election.

While the Census data available later will allow for a more thorough analysis, exit polling can give us an idea about turnout bias.

I used the Wall Street Journal exit data to examine the share of voters earning less than $50,000 (36%), between $50,000 and $100,000 (34%) and more than $100,000 (30%). I compared this with 2013 Census data showing the share of households in each of these groups. The data show that those earning less than $50,000 were strongly under-represented, while those earning more than $100,000 were overrepresented. The differences are strong—enough to have shaped many of the elections on Tuesday.

This is important—numerous studies find that the wealthy are far more opposed to redistribution, government spending and higher minimum wages than the rest of the population. The opinions of wealthy Americans finds that wealthy Democrats tend to be more conservative than other Democrats. Increased turnout among low income voters would change the behavior of both political parties.

There was another important voting gap this year—between whites and people of color. Studies find persistent gaps between non-white and white voters, although African Americans have closed that gap in recent elections. In 2014, people of color were far less likely to turnout to the polls than whites. I again used data from the Wall Street Journal and the Census Bureau. The Census Bureau data from 2012 allow us to examine the racial breakdown of the Voting Eligible population (citizens over 18).

The chart below shows that people of color were underrepresented in turnout for midterms. It is likely that their underrepresentation was even wider than the chart shows, since their share of the voting eligible population has increased since 2012.

These gaps can’t only be chocked up to an enthusiasm gap. There were policies in place explicitly aimed at suppressing low-income voters, young voters and voters of color.

Before the race, many states are currently purged their voter rolls; primarily affect people of color and the poor. Since 2006, 34 states have passed some form of voter ID law. Voter ID laws have a disproportionate impact on the young, people of color and low income voters. Further, these laws are explicitly aimed at reducing low-income turnout. One studyon the motivations of voter ID laws finds that, “larger increases in class-biased turnout, indicating higher turnout among lower income voters relative to wealthy voters, is significantly associated with a larger volume of proposed legislative changes.”

That is, when low income voters turnout at a higher rate, Republicans are more likely to propose voter ID laws. One study finds that the indirect costs of these laws—transportation, lost work time and the cost of acquiring the relevant documents – are higher than poll taxes were at the times they were instituted.

Additionally, states across the country have reduced early and weekend voting, both of which are necessary for low-wage workers who often cannot get off of work to vote (often due to unpredictable schedules). Further, felony disenfranchisement laws, which haveinfluenced the outcome of both presidential and Senate elections will disenfranchise almost 6 millions voters this year—most of them poor and people of color. If these turnout gaps were eliminated it would significantly change policy. State should encourage voting with Same-Day Registration, not discourage it through voting and registration impediments.

This article originally appeared on Policyshop.

How To Take Back Democracy On November 4th

Bold prediction: Rising inequality of income and wealth will be the most important political battleground over the next few decades.

Just take a look at the figures. The share of income accruing to the top 1 percent increased from 9 percent in 1976 to 20 percent in 2011. The richest 0.1 percent controlled 7 percent of the wealth in 1979 and 22 percent of the wealth in 2012. Meanwhile, there are a number of studies out there showing that the most effective way to reduce this inequality would be higher taxes on income and wealth, but the rich won’t let it happen.

Consider also this: The rise of income inequality and wealth inequality are intimately connected, and causes all sorts of problem over the long term. As Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman write,

Income inequality has a snowballing effect on the wealth distribution: top incomes are being saved at high rates, pushing wealth concentration up; in turn, rising wealth inequality leads to rising capital income concentration,which contributes to further increasing top income and wealth shares.

That is, income is a flow, which quickly becomes a stock. The rich make enough money to save; in contrast middle-class and low-income workers don’t have enough money to live, so they are increasingly burdened by debt. They can’t build up wealth, which means they are deprived of opportunity. This creates a self-perpetuating cycle of wealth on the top and debt on the bottom.

In a comedy bit on wealth, Chris Rock claims, “You can’t get rid of wealth.” The empirical research on the question largely supports his assertion. In “The Son Also Rises,” Gregory Clark finds that wealth remains in a family for 10-to-15 generations and notes,

Groups that seem to persist in low or high status, such as the black and the Jewish populations in the United States, are not exceptions to a general rule of higher intergenerational mobility. They are experiencing the same universal rates of slow intergenerational mobility as the rest of the population.

 

But, of course wealth and income inequality weren’t always as bad as they are today. What happened? In a word: cheating. Although many people try to explain rising inequality away by arguing we live in a winner-take-all economy or that inequality is the result of skill-biased technological change, these arguments are bunk. Inequality has been driven by public policy choices that favored the richthe decline of unions and the rise of finance. As the chart below shows, tax rates on both income and inheritance were high during the relatively equal ’60s, ’70s and ’80s and then fell dramatically paving the way for the inequality we see today (Chart Source).

The best way to reduce inequality would be to tax income and wealth. While conservatives often claim that this would reduce economic growth, such claims have very little economic support. For instance, Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez and Stefanie Stantcheva find no correlation between economic growth and tax cuts. Because of this, they find, “the top tax rate could potentially be set as high as 83%.” (Chart Source)

Nobel Prize-winner Peter Diamond argues that the top marginal tax rate could safely breach 73 percent, and indeed, such a rate might even be “optimal.” Another recent studyfinds the top marginal tax rate could be as high as 90 percent. Republicans sometimes claim that inequality is necessary for economic growth; in fact, the evidence suggests rather the opposite is true: High levels of inequality imperil growth.

But, here’s the problem: The same political forces that allowed the 1 percent to take our political system hostage have only worsened in the past decade. As Nick Hanauer notes in a recent Intelligence Squared debate,

At the same time, the percent of — of labor — the percent of GDP devoted to labor has gone from 52 to 42.  So that difference is about a trillion dollars annually.  So that — here’s the thing you have to understand.  That trillion dollars isn’t profit because it needs to be or should be or has to be.  It’s profit because powerful people like me and [Edward Conrad] prefer it to be.  That trillion dollars could very easily be spent on wages. Or — or on discounts for consumers.  This isn’t a consequence of some magical law of economics.  This is a consequence of differentials in power.

Nick hits on a very important point: The rising concentration of economic power hascoincided with a concentration of political power. A recent paper by Adam Bonica and others illustrates that as inequality has increased, the rich have spent more money on the political system:

 

As Benjamin Page, Larry Bartels and Jason Seawright recently found that the wealthy tend to be more economically conservative than the population at large. But a particularly startling finding is that, “on economic issues wealthy Democratic respondents tended to be more conservative than Democrats in the general population.” The wealthy are usingthe political system to turn their income into wealth and then that wealth into more wealth. They’re going to keep doing it, unless we stop them.  One solution is to reduce the massive turnout gap between the rich and poor.

Studies show that states with more low-income turnout have higher minimum wages, more generous child health insurance programs and stricter anti-predatory lending policies. They also have more generous welfare benefits. The fight against inequality will be a long one, but the first step is turning out to vote — the most radical step one can take in our country is actually believing democracy is more than just an idea.

This piece originally appeared on Salon

The Republican Party’s cynical electoral philosophy

Last week, the Supreme Court upheld a law that could disenfranchise 600,000 Texans. But the effects of the law won’t fall equally: African-Americans and Latinos are 305 percent and 195 percent less likely (respectively) to have the necessary forms of identification than whites. The Republican party is increasingly unpopular, and relies almost exclusively on white voters. The charts below show the 2008 if only white men voted and if only people of color voted (source). Since 2008, people of color become a growing share of the voting population while the GOP has, if anything, moved further to the right. It has further alienated voters of color with racist attacks and laws. But as they say: if you can’t beat ‘em, make sure they don’t vote. Over the last four years the Republicans have gone through elaborate attempts to make sure populations that don’t support them don’t get a chance to vote.

 Since 2006, Republicans have pushed through voter ID laws in 34 states.  Such laws did not exist before 2006, when Indiana passed the first voter ID law. The laws were ostensibly aimed at preventing voter fraud, but a News21 investigation finds only 2,068 instance of alleged fraud since 2000 (that is out of over 146 million voters). They estimate that there is one accusation of voter fraud for every 15 million voters. As Mother Jones notes, instances of voter fraud are more rare than UFO sightings. There have been only 13 instances of in-person voter fraud (the sorts that a voter ID law would reduce), while 47,000 people claim to have seen a UFO.

On the other hand, research by the Brennan Center for Justice finds that, “as many as 11 percent of eligible voters do not have government-issued photo ID.” Those who do not have ID are most likely to be “seniors, people of color, people with disabilities, low-income voters, and students” – i.e. people who vote Democratic (chart source).

There is now a large literature studying the effects of voter ID laws. James Avery and Mark Peffley find, “states with restrictive voter registration laws are much more likely to be biased toward upper-class turnout.” The GAO finds that, voter ID laws reduce turnout among those between ages 18-23 and African-Americans (two key Democratic constituencies). A 2013 study finds that the proposal and passage of voter ID laws are, “highly partisan, strategic, and racialized affairs.” They write, “Our findings confirm that Democrats are justified in their concern that restrictive voter legislation takes aim along racial lines with strategic partisan intent.” [Italics in original] The authors also find that increases in low-income voter turnout triggered voter ID laws. A more recent study finds, “where elections are competitive, the furtherance of restrictive voter ID laws is a means of maintaining Republican support while curtailing Democratic electoral gains.” That is, not all Republican legislatures propose voter ID laws – only those that face strong competition from Democrats. If Republicans are concerned about election integrity, why do they only pass voter ID laws when they’re about to lose an election? Because they’re using these laws for partisan advantage.

Voter ID laws are also racially motivated. A recent study finds that voters are significantly more likely to support a voter ID law when they are shown pictures of black people voting than when shown white people voting. In Minnesota, Take Action Minnesota showed that a pro-voter ID group had a picture on their website showing a black inmate voting and a man wearing a mariachi outfit – clearly playing off racial stereotypes.

But this isn’t the only time Republicans have tried to leverage state-level advantages into federal gains. After the 2010 walloping, Republicans decided they would need to tilt the odds in their favor. Using their control of state legislatures, they gerrymandered districts to ensure their victory. In 2012, Democrats actually had a larger share of the popular vote for the House of Representatives, while Republicans gained their largest House majority in 60 years. Cook Political Report noted, “House GOP Won 49 Percent of Votes, 54 Percent of Seats.” How? They changed the rules of the game. Karl Rove came out and said it in an op-ed, writing, “He who controls redistricting can control Congress.” They won in districts that were drawn specifically to allow them to win. There were certainly other factors at play, but it’s hard to image Republicans winning as many seats without their nifty swindle.

As Tim Dickinson points out, this isn’t the end:

In a project with the explicit blessing of Republican National Committee Chairman Reince Priebus, a half-dozen Republican-dominated legislatures in states that swing blue in presidential elections have advanced proposals to abandon the winner-take-all standard in the Electoral College…Thanks to the GOP’s gerrymandering, such a change would all but guarantee that a Democratic presidential candidate in a big, diverse state like Michigan would lose the split of electoral votes even if he or she won in a popular landslide.

If Republicans have their way, we’ll eventually be back to the days of the poll tax and the literacy test, where the votes of blacks, youth and the poor simply don’t count. We’re already half-way there; one study finds that the indirect costs of obtaining a voter ID are higher than the cost of a poll tax was. The Senate, with its antiquated system of two Senators per state means that the largely rural, old, white and conservative Midwest and South have far more sway than liberal metropolitan areas. By one estimate, 0.59% of the U.S. population will decide control of the Senate this election. This gives Republicans a strong advantage in the Senate, something to remember if they win it this election.

Republicans have also made use of felony disenfranchisement to boost their electoral success. Some 5.85 million Americans are denied the vote due to felony disenfranchisement. Because of the racial bias in our criminal justice system and the war on drugs, a disproportionate share of these voters are black. One study finds that because felons are more likely to be poor and people of color, disenfranchisement benefits Republicans. The authors estimate that, “at least one Republican presidential victory would have been reversed if former felons had been allowed to vote.” Further, they find that such laws may have impacted control of the Senate, and even more state and local elections. It’s no surprise that in Florida, a state where 10% of voters can’t vote because of a felony conviction, one of Rick Scott’s first moves as governor was to tighten rules for felons trying to gain voting rights. To add insult to injury, some 2 million incarcerated citizens are often counted as residents of the place where they are incarcerated, rather than their home. This allows districts where prisons are built to gain disproportionate influence because districts will often include large, non-voting prison populations. In Ward 6 of Rhode Island, prisoners represented 25% of the population.

The radicalism of the Tea Party and the Republican party at-large is partially due to the fact that they don’t represent the whole population- they represent a primarily white and middle to high income voting bloc. And that’s how Republicans want to keep it – they know they can’t win in fair race, so like Dick Dasterdly and Muttley, they set all sorts of obstacles in their opponent’s way. Hopefully, much like Dick Dasterdly and Muttley, their plan will blow up in their faces. Voters will be so angry about Republican attempts to suppress the vote that they’ll turn out in even higher numbers. Evidence suggests that a shift in turnout would have important effects on policy. Sadly, convicted felons, undocumented immigrants and many citizens without ID will still be denied the vote. In the cartoons, cheaters never win, for Republicans it’s been a successful electoral strategy for three decades running.

 

A version of this piece originally appeared on Salon.

The 1% are more likely to vote than the poor or the middle class, and it matters — a lot

Does it matter that the wealthy turnout to vote at a rate of almost 99% while those making below $10,000 vote at a rate of 49%? It sure seems like it would, but for a long time many political scientists and journalists believed it didn’t. In their seminal 1980 study on the question (using data from 1972) Raymond Wolfinger and Steven Rosenstone argued that, “voters are virtually a carbon copy of the citizen population.” In a 1999 study, Wolfinger and Benjamin  Highton find a slightly larger gap between voters and nonvoters, but stillconclude, “non-voters appear well represented by those who vote.”

This argument has been largely assimilated by pundits and also non-voters, 59% of whom believe “nothing ever gets done,” and 41% of whom say “my vote doesn’t make a difference anyway.”

But more recent research suggests that the logic of wealth voters is sound — and that if the poor and middle class turned out at a higher rate, policy would shift leftward on economic policy. The most importantstudy on the question is by Jan Leighley and Jonathan Nagler. They revisit the Wolfinger/Rosenstone thesis and find that, in fact, non-voters are not, “a carbon copy” of the voting electorate as previously assumed. They find that, “notable demographic, economic, and political changes that have occurred in the U.S. since Wolfinger and Rosenstone’s classic statement [their 1980 book, “Who Votes”].” The most important difference that Leighley and Nagler find is that:

After 1972, voters and non-voters differ significantly on most issues relating to the role of government in redistributive policies. In addition to these differences being evident in nearly every election since 1972, we also note that the nature of the electoral bias is clear as well: voters are substantially more conservative than non-voters on class-based issues.

 

That is, after the New Deal consensus eroded, policy views became more polarized along class lines and the class-skewed nature of the electorate began to matter considerably. Non-voters skew left on a variety of issues:

A Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC) study of Californians from 2006 finds that non-voters are more likely to support higher taxes and more services. They are also more likely to oppose Proposition 13 (a constitutional amendment which limits property taxes) and to support affordable housing (a more recent study finds similarly). More recently, a 2012 Pew study that examined likely voters and non-voters finds a strong partisan difference. While likely voters in the 2012 presidential election split 47% in favor of Obama and 47% in favor of Romney, 59% of non-voters supported Obama and only 24% supported Romney. The study also found divergence on other key policy issues, including healthcare, progressive taxation and the role of government in society.

The ideological turnout gap seems strongly related to the economic divide in voting behavior. A recent study by William Franko, Christopher Witko and Nathan Kelly examined 30 years of data for all 50 states. They find no instances in which low-income voter turnout was higher than high-income voter turnout. Across midterm and presidential elections, Census data show strong gaps between turnout rates between those earning above $150k and those earning less than $10k (a 32.6 point gap in 2008, a 34.9 point gap in 2010).

There is evidence that this affects the political system. Consider a recent study by David Broockman and Christopher Skovron finds that politicians believe that their constituencies are significantly more conservative than they are. Such a bias should be impossible to sustain – politicians have strong electoral incentives to gauge their constitutents’ views correctly. Once we understand that voters are more conservative than non-voters, the puzzle disappears. Politicians’s real constituents are the people who vote — a disproportionately affluent and conservative slice of the population.

Conversely, where the electorate is less skewed policy outcomes shift left. In a recent study William Franko, Nathan J. Kelly and Christopher Witko find that “where the poor exercise their voice more in the voting booth relative to higher income groups, inequality is lower.” In another study, Franko examined voting gaps and policy outcomes in three areas–minimum wages, anti-predatory lending laws and SCHIP (State Children’s Health Insurance Program). He finds that states with smaller voting gaps across incomes had policies more favorable to the poor. States with low turnout inequality have a higher minimum wage, stricter lending laws and more generous health benefits than those with high turnout inequality.

The design and benefit levels of  many social safety net programs such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), are decided at the state level, which provides a natural experiment to test how turnout inequality  affects policy. James Avery and Mark Peffley find that, in states with higher rates of low-income voting, politicians were less inclined to pass restrictive eligibility rules for social benefits. Political scientists Kim Hill and Jan Leighley find in two studies that states with a more pronounced turnout bias, social welfare spending is lower. Thus, the evidence confirms what theory would predict: closing low-income voting gaps is consequential for public policy, in favor of lower-income households.

This piece originally appeared on Vox.